

Message Text

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TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: AIR MANPOWER

REF: A. USNATO 0025; B. BONN 0234; C. MBFR VIENNA 0513;

D. STATE 263366; E. USNATO 5388; F. USNATO 6349

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1. AS A RESULT OF OUR REVIEW OF THE AIR MANPOWER ISSUE, WE HAVE MODIFIED OUR VIEWS ON THE TACTICS FOR PRESENTATION TO THE EAST OF THE AIR MANPOWER PROPOSALS WE HAVE PROPOSED FOR NATO APPROVAL. WE BELIEVE APPROACH DESCRIBED BELOW HAS BETTER NEGOTIATING VALUE THAN SERIATIM INTRODUCTION OF THE REMAINING COMPONENTS OF THE US AIR MANPOWER PACKAGE. THIS IN TURN AFFECTS OUR VIEWS ON THE DATA ISSUES RAISED BY THE AHG IN REF (C). THE FOLLOWING POINTS SHOULD BE DRAWN ON AS APPROPRIATE IN ORDER TO MOVE TOWARD TIMELY NATO GUIDANCE ON THESE ISSUES.

2. AS INTRODUCTION THE MISSION AND BONN AND LONDON SHOULD POINT OUT THAT THE ALLIES HAVE PROPOSED TO THE EAST A POSSIBLE EXPLORATION OF DEFINITIONS AND DATA, INCLUDING RECATEGORIZATION (REF B). THE ALLIES THEN PROPOSED A NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT (REF C) THAT WOULD LIMIT AIR MANPOWER BETWEN PHASES AND INDICATED THEY WOULD CONSIDER APPROPRIATE WAYS OF COVERING AIR MANPOWER IN PHASE II.

3. ALTHOUGH IT WAS NOT OUR INTENT, THESE PROPOSALS TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION, MAY HAVE SUGGESTED TO THE EAST THAT THE WEST WOULD ACCEPT A PHASE II OUTCOME THAT INCLUDED A GROUND FORCES COMMON CEILING, WHICH AS REDEFINED, COULD EXCLUDE THE GROUND COMPONENTS OF THE POLISH AND CZECH TERRITORIAL AIR DEFENSE FORCES, AND A PERMANENT FREEZE ON AIR AND AIR DEFENSE MANPOWER. REF (A) SUGGESTS THE BELGIANS FAVOR MAKING THIS POINT EXPLICIT.

4. SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD INVOLVE CODIFICATION OF A SUBSTANTIAL CONTINUING MANPOWER DISPARITY AS REGARDS AIR AND AIR DEFENSE FORCES (ABOUT 50,000 MEN FOLLOWING RECATEGORIZATION) ALTHOUGH THERE WOULD BE A COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCES.

5. IN ANY EVENT, WE NOTE THAT THE EAST HAS SAID THAT IT CONTINUES TO BE INTERESTED IN REDUCTION OF AIR FORCES. TO MEET THESE CONCERNS, WITHOUT IN ANY WAY COMMITTING THE ALLIES TO AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II, WE BELIEVE THE NAC SHOULD APPROVE FOR ADVANCEMENT TO THE EAST A COMBINED PROPOSAL TO INCLUDE AIR MANPOWER IN THE COMMON
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CEILING, TO INCLUDE AIR MANPOWER IN THE DATA BASE FOR COMPUTING PHASE I GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS, AND TO ALLOW REDUCTION OF US AND SOVIET AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN PHASE I.

6. WE BELIEVE THESE ELEMENTS WOULD HAVE MAXIMUM NEGOTIATING LEVERAGE IF PRESENTED TOGETHER. PRESENTATION OF A PROPOSAL FOR INCLUSION OF AIR MANPOWER IN THE COMMON CEILING ALONE WITHOUT ANY AIR REDUCTIONS IN EITHER PHASE

WOULD NOT SUBSTANTIALLY ADVANCE OUR REDUCTION PROPOSALS FROM THE EASTERN POINT OF VIEW. THIS IS BECAUSE INCLUSION OF AIR FORCES IN THE COMMON CEILING WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF RETURNING THE POLISH AND CZECH GROUND BASED TERRITORIAL AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL TO THE REDUCTIONS THE EAST WOULD HAVE TO MAKE TO REACH THE COMMON CEILING. AT THE SAME TIME THE PROPOSAL WOULD DO NOTHING TO MEET THE CONTINUED EASTERN DEMAND FOR AIR FORCE REDUCTIONS. THIS POINT HAS BEEN RAISED IN THE SPC DISCUSSION OF THE TOPIC ON JANUARY 6.

7. CONSEQUENTLY, WE PROPOSE THAT THE NAC AUTHORIZE THE AHG TO INFORM THE EAST THAT, TO MEET EASTERN CONCERNs AND ADVANCE THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE ALLIES WOULD BE WILLING TO TAKE THE FOLLOWING STEPS:

A. TO INCLUDE AIR MANPOWER IN THE COMMON CEILING; THE END RESULT OF REDUCTIONS IN BOTH PHASES WOULD BE AN EQUAL TOTAL LEVEL OF GROUND AND AIR PERSONNEL ON BOTH SIDES.

B. ALTHOUGH THE WEST CONTINUES TO OPPOSE OBLIGATORY REDUCTIONS OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER, IT IS WILLING IN PHASE I TO AGREE THAT THE US AND USSR CAN INCLUDE AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN THEIR TOTAL REDUCTIONS.

C. THUS, WE WOULD PROPOSE THAT IN PHASE I, THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION EACH REDUCE 15 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL OF THEIR GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA. THIS WOULD SOMEWHAT INCREASE THE TOTAL NUMBER OF PERSONNEL REDUCED ON EACH SIDE IN PHASE I.

D. THE US AND SOVIET PHASE I REDUCTIONS WOULD CONTINUE TO INCLUDE AT LEAST 15 PERCENT OF US AND OF

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SOVIET GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA. THUS, PROPOSED SOVIET GROUND REDUCTIONS WOULD CONTINUE TO CONSIST OF AT LEAST 68,000 GROUND PERSONNEL INCLUDING A TANK ARMY OF 1700 MAIN BATTLE TANKS.

E. FOR ITS PART, THE US WOULD BE WILLING TO INCLUDE SOME AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN ITS PHASE I REDUCTIONS WITHIN THE OVERALL 15 PERCENT MANPOWER REDUCTIONS DESCRIBED IN SUB-PARAGRAPH C ABOVE. THE EXACT COMPOSITION OF THE MANPOWER REDUCTION PERCENTAGES WOULD BE A MATTER FOR DETERMINATION IN A LATER POINT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

8. WE RECOGNIZE THAT COMBINING THE ELEMENTS OF THE US AIR PROPOSALS IN THIS WAY MIGHT INTENSIFY FRG CONCERNs ABOUT THE PRECEDENT-SETTING EFFECT FOR AIR REDUCTIONS

IN PHASE II. THEREFORE, IN INTRODUCING THIS PROPOSAL, THE MISSION AND EMBASSY BONN SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THE US INTENDS TO ADHERE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF VOLUNTARY INCLUSION OF AIR MANPOWER IN REDUCTIONS UNLESS THE ALLIES THEMSELVES DECIDE TO CHANGE THEIR POSITION. THE US WILL NOT PRESS ANY ALLY TO INCLUDE AIR PERSONNEL REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II AND WILL SUPPORT ANY ALLY IF IT DECIDES NOT TO INCLUDE REDUCTIONS OF ITS AIR PERSONNEL. THE US DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THIS APPROACH CREATES ANY PRECEDENT FOR PHASE II OTHER THAN OPTIONAL INCLUSION OF AIR MANPOWER IN REDUCTIONS MADE BY INDIVIDUAL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.

9. OUR PREFERENCES FOR PACKAGING THE ELEMENTS OF THE US AIR PROPOSALS IN THE ABOVE MANNER LEADS TO SOME FURTHER CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE DATA ISSUES RAISED BY THE AHG (REF C).

10. SINCE PHASE I REDUCTIONS WOULD, UNDER THE PROPOSED NEW FORMULATION, BE BASED ON THE US AND SOVIET AGGREGATES OF AIR AND GROUND MANPOWER, IT WOULD BECOME APPROPRIATE TO SUPPLY DATA FOR THOSE TWO AGGREGATES. SIMILARLY, PROPOSING INCLUSIONS OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN THE COMMON CEILING MAKES IT APPROPRIATE TO SUPPLY FIGURES FOR NATO AND PACT AIR PLUS GROUND AGGREGATES. JUST AS
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THE FOUR GROUND MANPOWER ESTIMATES WERE APPROPRIATE FOR THE ORIGINAL NATO PROPOSAL BASED ON GROUND MANPOWER, A SIMILAR SET OF FOUR AGGREGATE AIR PLUS GROUND MANPOWER ESTIMATES (US, SOVIET, NATO AND WARSAW PACT) IS APPROPRIATE FOR THE MODIFICATION PROPOSED ABOVE. FINALLY, IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE TO DESCRIBE THE REVISED COMMON CEILING OBJECTIVE AT AN ILLUSTRATIVE LEVEL OF 900,000 MEN.

11. HOWEVER, IF THE PACKAGING CONCEPT OF PARA 6 IS ADOPTED AND IF THESE FOUR AGGREGATE ESTIMATES ARE SUPPLIED, USING NATO BEST ESTIMATES, THERE IS NO NEED, IN OUR VIEW, TO SUPPLY TO THE EAST AT THIS POINT EITHER UPDATED GROUND MANPOWER ESTIMATES FOR NATO AND THE PACT OR CURRENT AIR MANPOWER ESTIMATES. SUCH FIGURES WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY FOR EXPLANATION AND SUPPORT OF OUR MODIFIED PROPOSALS. MOREOVER, SUPPLYING ONLY AIR PLUS GROUND AGGREGATE PERSONNEL ESTIMATES WOULD INHIBIT DIRECT COMPARISON WITH THE PREVIOUSLY SUPPLIED GROUND PERSONNEL ESTIMATES THUS AVOIDING THE NEED TO EXPLAIN THE INCREASE IN NATO GROUND FORCES.

12. THE ALLIES ARE LIKELY TO ASK WHETHER THE US INTENDS TO TAKE THE FULL 15 PERCENT AIR FORCE MANPOWER REDUCTION ALLOWED BY THE PROPOSAL. THE MISSION SHOULD REPLY THAT THE US HAS NOT AS YET DECIDED ON DETAILS; HOWEVER, PREVIOUS USG GUIDANCE TO NATO THAT US AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS WILL BE ESTABLISHED AT A LEVEL WHICH DOES NOT REQUIRE A REDUCTION IN THE LEVEL OF US TACTICAL FIGHTERS EXCEPT IN THE CONTEXT OF OPTION III (IF IT IS PLAYED) STILL APPLIES. WE DO NOT IN ANY EVENT WISH TO MAKE THIS POINT PRECISE WITH SOVIETS AT THIS STAGE, BOTH FOR DATA AND GENERAL NEGOTIATING REASONS.

13. FOR BONN AND LONDON: YOU SHOULD INFORM APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS OF THIS POSITION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

14. FOR NATO: YOU-SHOULD INFORM UK AND FRG REPS BEFORE PRESENTING IT TO THE SPC. INGERSOLL

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